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Abstract 
People are motivated to protect their worldviews. One way to protect one’ worldviews is through 
prejudice towards worldview-dissimilar groups and individuals. The traditional hypothesis 
predicts that people with more traditional and conservative worldviews will be more likely to 
protect their worldviews with prejudice than people with more liberal and progressive 
worldviews, whereas the worldview conflict hypothesis predicts that people with both traditional 
and liberal worldviews will be protect their worldviews through prejudice. We review evidence 
across both political and religious domains, as well as evidence using disgust sensitivity, Big 
Five personality traits, and cognitive ability as measures of individual differences historically 
associated with prejudice. We discuss four core findings that are consistent with the worldview 
conflict hypothesis: (1) The link between worldview conflict and prejudice is consistent across 
worldviews. (2) The link between worldview conflict and prejudice is found across various 
expressions of prejudice. (3) The link between worldview conflict and prejudice is found in 
multiple countries. (4) Openness, low disgust sensitivity, and cognitive ability - traits and 
individual differences historically associated with less prejudice - may in fact also show evidence 
of worldview conflict. We discuss how worldview conflict may be rooted in value dissimilarity, 
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Worldview Conflict and Prejudice 
Many perspectives in social psychology assume that people are motivated to protect the 
validity and vitality of their views, from their self-views to their worldviews (Greenwald, 1980; 
Kunda, 1990; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Mutz, 2007; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). People 
with negative self-views prefer to hear negative feedback about themselves, whereas people with 
positive self-views prefer to hear positive feedback (Swann, 2011). Similarly, people search for 
information, interpret that information, and otherwise engage with it in ways that confirm their 
prior attitudes and worldviews (Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017; Hart et al., 2009; Taber & Lodge, 
2006). When those views are not confirmed, people feel angry (Brandt, Crawford, & Van 
Tongeren, 2019) and show physiological markers of stress (Townsend, Major, Sawyer, & 
Mendes, 2010).  
Worldviews might be one type of view particularly important for people to protect. 
They are a set of values and beliefs that describe how the world should and does work (for 
discussions of worldview as a construct in psychology, see Johnson, Hill, & Cohen, 2011; 
Koltko-Rivera, 2004). In this way, they provide individuals and groups with schemas to interpret 
and navigate their social worlds (Janoff-Bulman, 1989). Worldviews may be relevant to a 
number of domains, including politics (e.g., a socialist worldview), religion (e.g., a Catholic 
worldview), and combinations of the two (e.g., a liberation theology worldview). In principle, 
everyone has a worldview (or potentially multiple worldviews) because they have schemas for 
interpreting their world. In practice, the worldviews that attract the attention of psychology 
researchers are shared, to some degree, with a larger group of people (e.g., the 26% of 
Americans who identify as liberals; Saad, 2019). Although everyone has a worldview to some 
degree, this does not mean that everyone has a coherent worldview that is also the object of 
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psychological study (e.g., not everyone has a coherent political worldview; Converse, 1964; 
Kinder & Kalmoe, 2018).   
One way that people can defend their worldview is by derogating and denigrating 
individuals and groups who disagree with their worldview, or otherwise represent a threat to the 
ideas and values that the worldview represents. Worldview conflict is when people encounter 
information that conflicts and disagrees with their worldview. Although this could be any kind of 
worldview conflicting information (e.g., an economic policy with worldview-inconsistent 
consequences), we study how worldview conflict is related to prejudice. And so, we typically 
examine conditions when another person or group holds conflicting worldviews. Worldview 
conflict inspired prejudice might include describing a politician with ideas you don’t like as 
“insane” and as a person “who doesn’t seem to know much about anything.” However, it can 
also include dislike, dehumanization, social distance, and other denigrations of the group and its 
members. Not only do these responses to worldview-dissimilar groups derogate the group and its 
ideas, it also may serve to improve one’s own self-views or group-views, just as other forms of 
prejudice can boost self-esteem (Fein & Spencer, 1997).  
We study worldview conflict as it manifests across three broad measures. Prejudice is 
the negative evaluation of a group or its members based on group membership (Brown, 2010; 
Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002). This definition focuses on the clear psychological issue 
at stake, negative evaluations. We typically focus on prejudice as it is assessed using two 
common measures of prejudice in the literature (Correll, Judd, Park, & Wittenbrink, 2010): 
feeling thermometers that ask participants to rate how cold/disliking or warm/liking they feel 
towards a particular group, or measures of social distance which ask participants how socially 
near or far they would accept particular groups in their lives (e.g., as friends or coworkers). We 
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also assess such evaluations with other measures, such as negative stereotypes, emotions, or 
implicit associations. 
A particularly pernicious form of prejudice is dehumanization, where people assign 
non-human traits and descriptions to human groups and individuals (Haslam, 2006; Haslam & 
Loughnan, 2014; Kteily, Bruneau, Waytz, & Cotterill, 2015). Although this might seem a 
particularly extreme form of dislike (and is indeed correlated with standard measures of 
prejudice), it appears to predict relevant behaviors above and beyond typical measures of 
prejudice (e.g., Kteily et al., 2015). Dehumanization measures include those involved attributing 
non-human (i.e. non-complex) traits (Crawford, Modri, & Motyl, 2013; Haslam & Loughnan, 
2014) and those explicitly comparing human groups to insects (e.g., Epley, Waytz, Akalis, & 
Cacioppo, 2008) or other animals (e.g., Kteily et al., 2015). 
Prejudice is theoretically interesting, in part, because it may be associated with harmful 
behaviors and intentions. This might include measures of a willingness to discriminate 
(Wetherell et al., 2013), political intolerance (Gibson, 2006), or outcomes of economic games 
(e.g., dictator game; Crawford, Brandt, Inbar, Chambers, & Motyl, 2017; Engel, 2011).1 These 
measures capture the willingness to harm someone, including the denial of rights and the 
destruction of property, based on their group membership, as well as people’s actual behaviors 
that harm others. 
                                                 
1 Political intolerance is more often studied by political scientists (Gibson, 2006). There is a tradition in political 
science of measuring intolerance using the least like group paradigm (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1979), where 
participants complete intolerance items about a single group they dislike the most. This measure, however, does not 
work for our purposes because testing worldview conflict requires that we test intolerance for both worldview 
upholding and worldview violating groups. Therefore, we use intolerance items that are directed at a variety of 
specific groups (e.g., Crawford & Pilanski, 2014).  
 
Worldview Conflict & Prejudice  6 
 
In the following sections we will compare the traditional and worldview conflict 
perspectives on the association between political worldviews and prejudice. Then, we extend 
these ideas to understand the link between religious fundamentalism and prejudice. These studies 
reviewed suggest that both liberals and conservatives, as well as fundamentalists and non-
fundamentalists, express prejudice towards groups with dissimilar worldviews. This is surprising 
because liberal and progressive worldviews are often associated with traits (e.g., Openness to 
experience) that should make them more open to different perspectives. Therefore, we review 
evidence suggesting that many traits typically associated with tolerance may also show signs of 
worldview conflict. In the final sections of the chapter, we discuss potential mechanisms and 
methods of reducing worldview conflict, as well as how research on worldview conflict and 
prejudice is related to larger theoretical debates on ideological differences and similarities. 
Comparing the Traditional and the Worldview Conflict Perspectives 
The central question that we have examined with our research program is whether 
people with more traditional and conservative worldviews experience more worldview conflict 
than people with more progressive and liberal worldviews. This question is important practically 
because it gives us insight into the nature of political polarization and conflicts over value-laden 
beliefs. It is important theoretically because it gives insight into whether or not the processes 
underlying worldview conflict are similar or different across worldviews. This is, in turn, 
relevant to larger debates about the similarities and differences of psychological processes 
between adherents of different worldviews. 
There are multiple perspectives that can be leveraged to predict whether people with 
more traditional and conservative worldviews experience more worldview conflict than people 
with more progressive and liberal worldviews. Perspectives ranging from conservatism as 
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motivated cognition (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003), dual-process theories of 
prejudice (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), social identity theory (Brown, 2000), moral foundations 
theory (Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, 2013), and the defense of 
psychological threats (Jonas et al., 2014) all touch on psychological and social processes that 
likely contribute to worldview conflict. When it comes to predicting whether liberals or 
conservatives are more likely to engage in worldview conflict, we can make the case for two 
different broad hypotheses, the traditional hypothesis and the worldview conflict hypothesis. 
Traditional Hypothesis 
The traditional hypothesis predicts that people with more traditional and conservative 
worldviews will engage in more worldview conflict than people with more progressive and 
liberal worldviews. The case for the traditional hypothesis starts with the findings that 
conservatives (i.e., people with more traditional worldviews) are more likely to be intolerant of 
ambiguity (Sidanius, 1978), prefer order and structure (Kemmelmeier, 1997), be sensitive to 
threat (Oxley et al., 2008), and perceive the world as a threatening place (Sibley, Wilson, & 
Duckitt, 2007) than liberals (i.e., people with more progressive worldviews). Research also 
indicates that conservatives are also less open to experience (Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 
1997), intelligent (Hodson & Busseri, 2012), and cognitively complex (Sidanius, 1985) than 
liberals (for meta-analyses addressing these questions, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 
2003; Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, Hodson, Schittekatte, & De 
Pauw, 2015; Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, & Pattyn, 2013; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Sibley, Osborne, 
& Duckitt, 2012; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010; for narrative reviews, see Hibbing, Smith, 
& Alford, 2014; Jost, 2017). When a perceiver encounters a target with a different worldview, 
this may increase the necessity for cognitive complexity in understanding that target’s 
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worldview. This may increase the perceiver’s feelings of ambiguity and violate their sense of 
order. For people who do not like to think complexly and who are bothered more by ambiguity 
and less order, encountering people with differing worldviews may then be particularly aversive 
and inspire more prejudice (for additional theoretical detail, see Dhont & Hodson, 2014; Hodson 
& Dhont, 2015). And so, these dispositional correlates are all likely to prime the pump for 
prejudice among conservatives and reduce the likelihood of prejudice expression among liberals. 
This is consistent with evidence that liberals are more motivated to appear unprejudiced 
(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Plant & Devine, 1998), even toward ideologically dissimilar 
groups (Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015). 
Consistent with the traditional hypothesis, the scholarly literature is filled with examples 
of conservatives expressing more prejudice, dehumanization, and intolerance than liberals. 
Conservatives, for example, score higher on measures of racism (Sears & Henry, 2003), anti-gay 
prejudice (Terrizzi, Shook, & Ventis, 2010), anti-trans prejudice (Hoffarth & Hodson, 2018), 
anti-immigrant prejudice (Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004), sexism (Christopher & Mull, 
2006), and anti-poor people prejudice (Zucker & Weiner, 1993) than do liberals (for a meta-
analysis, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). In fact, conservatives express more generalized prejudice 
– a dispositional tendency to express prejudice towards a wide variety of groups – than do 
liberals (McFarland, 2010). This set of findings is also consistent with work from moral 
foundations theory (Graham et al., 2013), which suggests that conservatives compared to liberals 
put a moral premium on loyalty to their own group and purity concerns, and put less of a moral 
premium on issues related to caring for others and treating others fairly.  
The case for religiosity follows a similar logical structure as the case for political 
ideology. People with strong religious beliefs, especially orthodox or fundamentalist religious 
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beliefs, tend to score higher on a number of dispositional indicators of closed-mindedness. This 
includes scoring higher on measures of need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Saroglou, 
2002a), need for structure (Hill, Cohen, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2010), and authoritarian dispositions 
(Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001), as well as 
lower on measures of Openness to Experience (Saroglou, 2002b), creativity (Saroglou, 2002c), 
and need for cognition (Hill et al., 2010) than their non-religious counterparts. At the same time, 
religions tend to encourage love and charity for fellow humans (Schumann, McGregor, Nash & 
Ross, 2014), consistent with the finding that religious people score higher on benevolence values 
(Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004) and prosocial value orientation (Malka, Soto, Cohen, & 
Miller, 2011). Combining these two observations, scholars often observe that religious people 
will be more charitable towards people who uphold their values, or maybe even people with 
unspecified group affiliations; however, the same people will tend to be less generous towards 
people who violate their values (e.g., feminists; Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011). Similarly, 
religious fundamentalism is associated with prejudice towards a variety of groups, including 
single mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997), gays and lesbians (Brandt & Reyna, 2010, 2014), and 
Black people (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). Consistent with the traditional hypothesis, religious 
people are expected to express more prejudice than non-religious people; when religion increases 
prosocial, including tolerant attitudes, it is typically only towards people and groups who uphold 
their religious values.  
The two examples of the traditional hypothesis for political ideology and religiosity are 
just that, examples. The logic of the hypothesis, however, should extend to any traditional belief 
system that is associated with dispositions that make prejudice more likely, including 
dispositions like the intolerance of ambiguity, sensitivity to threat, the need for closure, and 
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closed-mindedness. In this way, the traditional hypothesis embodies the idea that psychological 
processes differ between different ideological camps, and that these different psychological 
processes will have differential impacts on other broadly relevant attitudes and behaviors. 
Worldview Conflict Hypothesis 
The worldview conflict hypothesis predicts that regardless of their worldview, people 
will express prejudice towards individuals and groups perceived to hold conflicting attitudes and 
values. From this perspective, the important detail for determining who expresses prejudice is 
not whether a person is a liberal or a conservative, a progressive or a traditionalist, or a religious 
person or an atheist. Rather, the important detail is instead whether a person sees a group as 
holding conflicting attitudes and values – in short, a different worldview. A person’s worldview 
is important for understanding which group a person will express prejudice towards, not whether 
they will express prejudice. 
This straightforward hypothesis can be understood from a number of different 
perspectives. Most directly, this hypothesis essentially restates the similarity-liking principle 
(Byrne, 1969) in reverse, making the worldview conflict hypothesis essentially a dissimilarity-
disliking principle. The tight connection between attitudinal similarity and liking was studied 
extensively in the 1960’s and 1970’s (for a meta-analysis, see Montoya, Horton & Kirchner 
2008). Researchers would bring people to the lab to interact with another participant (in reality, 
no such other participant was typically present). Prior to the interaction, participants would 
complete an attitudinal questionnaire; the questionnaire would be ostensibly given to the other 
participant, and the actual participant would receive information about the attitudes of their 
ostensible interaction partner. After reading over these attitudinal responses, which were 
manipulated to be more or less similar to the participants, the participants would rate their liking 
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of their ostensible future interaction partner. The common finding across many variations of this 
paradigm is that increased similarity is linearly related to increased liking. The explanation for 
this effect was couched in a stimulus-response framework, such that similar people provided 
more positive relatively to negative reinforcements which increases liking (Byrne, 1969). For 
Byrne, this effect was so stable and convincing that he referred to it as a psychological law 
(Byrne & Nelson, 1965) and we know now that this link between dissimilarity and disliking 
develops early in life (Wynn, 2016). 
More contemporary theoretical perspectives can also be used to derive the worldview 
conflict hypothesis. Work on symbolic threat (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993; Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006) and value violations (Henry & Reyna, 2007), for example, can be seen as 
modern instantiations of classic similarity-liking research. This work finds that a strong and 
consistent predictor of prejudice is the perception that a group does not share the culture or 
values of the individual (for a meta-analysis, see Riek et al., 2006). One study found that a key 
predictor of opposition to welfare policies and gay rights was the perception that people on 
welfare and gay people violate values related to self-reliance or traditionalism (Henry & Reyna, 
2007). Similar results have been found regarding multiple target groups in multiple countries 
(e.g., Rooij, Goodwin, & Pickup, 2018; Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan, Ybarra, 
Martnez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998; Velasco González, Verkuyten, Weesje, & Poppe, 
2008). Such value threats also, in part, help explain hostility between the Middle East and the 
U.S. (Sidanius, Kteily, Levin, Pratto, & Obaidi 2016). 
The meaning maintenance model (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Proulx, Inzlicht, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2012) and related mental-conflict approaches (Jonas et al., 2014; Gawronski, 
2012; Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) rooted in classic dissonance theory (Festinger, 
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1957) can also be used to understand the worldview conflict hypothesis. The meaning 
maintenance model assumes that people are motived to maintain a sense of meaning and 
understanding of how the world works. One prediction that follows from this assumption is that 
challenges to one’s sense of meaning and understanding should lead to defensive reactions that 
help defend this sense of meaning (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Rosenblatt, Veeder, 
Kirkland, & Lyon, 1990; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Proulx & Major, 2013). Worldviews are one 
way that people attempt to understand their world and imbue it with meaning. Religions make 
this explicit and prescribe a variety of activities and modes of thought that are intended to make 
life meaningful. Political worldviews are not so different. When individuals and groups do not 
share one’s worldview, it suggests that one’s own worldview may not be effective at explaining 
how the world should and does work, reducing the meaning-making effectiveness of one’s 
worldview. Derogating such groups with conflicting worldviews helps people maintain the 
validity and vitality of their own worldview. 
Lastly, different worldviews may be another attribute by which people sort others into 
groups. Just as people quickly categorize others into groups based on their perceived sex, age, 
race/ethnicity, or social status, they do the same for worldview-based groups (Koch, Imhoff, 
Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016; Koch, Kervyn, Kervyn, & Imhoff, 2018). For example, the 
“Who Said What” memory confusion paradigm (Pietraszewski, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014; 
Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) uses patterns of memory errors to unobtrusively detect 
the characteristics people use to categorize individuals into groups. Using this paradigm, 
Pietraszewski and colleagues (Pietraszewski, Curry, Petersen, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2015) found 
that people spontaneously used political party affiliation to encode and retrieve group-relevant 
information. From an evolutionary perspective (Boyer, Firat, & van Leeuwen, 2015; Clark, Liu, 
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Winegard, & Ditto, in press; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010), this suggests 
that worldviews serve as an indicator of coalitions and group membership, which people see as a 
part of themselves (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). When people share our worldviews, they are on our 
teams and provide a potential ally. However, when people do not share our worldviews, they 
have different goals and values and are less likely to have our best interests at heart. And so, in 
an effort to support our goals we may express prejudice towards those who are not in our 
coalitions.  
The veracity of each of these potential routes to the logic behind the worldview conflict 
hypothesis may be challenged. However, our key point is that there are multiple theoretical 
perspectives from across the history of social psychology and from different subfields of social 
psychology that provide reasons why most people may express prejudice towards people with 
dissimilar worldviews. Although some of these perspectives expect that such an effect will be 
similar across people with different types of worldviews (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Proulx & 
Major, 2013), many are not explicit on this point beyond noting the ubiquity of these worldview 
conflict processes (e.g., Bryne, 1969; Wynn, 2016). In our work, we are able to test for 
differences in worldview conflict between differing worldviews. 
How do we compare these two hypotheses?  
We have set out to compare the traditional hypothesis and the worldview conflict. A key 
challenge for addressing whether or not people with different worldviews have different 
psychological processes is that many of the best demonstrations of different processes rely on 
paradigms with content that is not balanced across the worldviews under study (Malka, Lelkes, 
& Holzer, 2017). For example, Altemeyer (1998) concluded that people high in right-wing 
authoritarianism (a traditional worldview) are more prone to double standards in their 
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information processing than people low in right-wing authoritarianism on the basis of evidence 
that people high in right-wing authoritarianism were more supportive of mandatory Christian 
school prayer than mandatory Muslim school prayer; people low in right-wing authoritarianism 
evinced no biases. However, the premise of the judgment (mandatory prayer) is something that 
people low in right-wing authoritarianism object to, but people high in right-wing 
authoritarianism do not object to. Crawford (2012) demonstrated that changing the premise of 
the judgment to be more equally supported among people low and high in right-wing 
authoritarianism (space set aside in public schools for voluntary prayer), biases among people 
low and high in right-wing authoritarianism could emerge. Thus, in order to examine whether 
processes are equivalent or not, tests must be set up to allow for this, and oftentimes, the tests are 
not.  
The literature on worldviews and prejudice presents a similar situation. Meta-analyses 
and other large-scale investigations often find that people with more traditional worldviews 
express more prejudice than people with more progressive worldviews (Hall et al., 2010; Sibley 
& Duckitt, 2008). This could be taken as evidence of ideological asymmetries in psychological 
processes related to prejudice. However, these studies were not designed to test both the 
traditional and the worldview conflict hypotheses. Instead, they were designed to test how 
worldviews are associated with a number of prejudices that tear at the social fabric of pluralistic 
and multicultural societies, such as prejudice towards ethnic minority groups, immigrants, and 
women. Indeed, historically, the typical target group in the literature is a group that is liberal or 
progressive, or at least emblematic of liberal and progressive causes. This suggests that any 
observed worldview asymmetry, such as that observed in the above meta-analyses, may be less 
of an asymmetry of process and more of an asymmetry of content. To simultaneously test the 
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traditional and worldview conflict hypotheses it is necessary to use a larger number of target 
groups that includes groups that are likely to violate the worldviews of a variety of people, 
including conservatives and liberals. 
The typical use of unbalanced stimuli to study prejudice makes it impossible to 
distinguish between support for the traditional hypothesis and the worldview conflict hypothesis 
in the past literature.  The previously-observed associations between certain worldviews (e.g., 
conservatism) and prejudice might be due to different prejudice-related processes (e.g., low 
cognitive ability, low openness to experience) as the traditional hypothesis predicts, but they may 
also be due to differences in content as the worldview conflict hypothesis predicts. To 
distinguish between the two hypotheses, it is necessary to at least include groups who are 
perceived to hold multiple and opposing worldviews (Brandt & Crawford, 2019). Therefore, 
when studying political ideology, we need to include both liberal groups and conservative 
groups. And when studying religion, we need to include both religious groups and non-religious 
(or even anti-religious) groups. A more robust method is to include groups who are 
representative of important groups within a given social context (Koch et al., 2016). This allows 
the researcher to more easily generalize from their stimuli to the target population of stimuli 
(e.g., social groups in society) and explore how different features of the stimuli contribute to the 
association between worldviews and prejudice (Brandt & Crawford, 2019). These benefits of 
heterogeneous stimuli are well known (Brunswik, 1956; Wells & Windschitl, 1999). We apply 
heterogeneous stimuli to study worldview conflict.  
What Do We Find? 
In our work comparing the traditional and worldview conflict hypotheses, we measure 
people’s worldviews and then ask them to express their feelings towards target individuals or 
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groups that are perceived as holding similar or opposing worldviews, or to express their feelings 
towards a large, heterogeneous sample of target groups. This creates strong tests of the two 
hypotheses by creating conditions where the hypotheses make conflicting predictions (Platt, 
1964; Washburn & Skitka, 2018). Specifically, the traditional hypothesis predicts that prejudice 
should be unique to people holding traditional worldviews. We interpret this perspective as 
predicting a spreading interaction, reminiscent of a hungry alligator, where people with 
traditional worldviews derogate groups with opposing worldviews more so than groups with 
similar worldviews, whereas people with progressive worldviews do not derogate groups with 
opposing worldviews any more than groups with similar worldviews. The worldview conflict 
hypothesis predicts that prejudice should be found amongst people with all sorts of worldviews. 
In the typical study design, this perspective predicts a cross-over interaction where people with 
both traditional and progressive worldviews derogate groups with opposing worldviews more so 
than people with similar worldviews. These predictions are visualized in Figure 1.2 
 
                                                 
2 The analyses and figures in this chapter were made possible with R version 3.5.2 (2018) and the following 
packages: cowplot (Wilke, 2019), grid (R Core Team, 2018), lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), 
metafor (Viechtbauer, 2019), rio (Chan, Chan, Leeper, & Becker, 2018), and tidyverse (Wickham, 2017). 
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Figure 1. The predicted results of the traditional hypothesis and the worldview conflict 
hypothesis in the typical study design.  
 
Ideology and Prejudice 
The Original Studies 
We first tested the worldview conflict and traditional hypotheses in the political domain. 
Back then, we didn’t know each other or that we were working on these topics. Yet, with 
separate teams of collaborators, we conducted conceptually identical studies. Crawford and 
Pilanski (2014) measured American participants’ identification as a liberal or a conservative 
using the standard one-item, seven-point scale of ideological identification. Half of their 
participants completed an intolerance scale for left-wing targets, which included items like, “I 
think that members of a state Pro‐Choice organization should be allowed to distribute pro‐choice 
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pamphlets and buttons on local college campuses.” The other half completed the same 
intolerance scale for right-wing targets, which included items like, “I think that members of a 
state Right to Life organization should be allowed to distribute pro‐life pamphlets and buttons on 
local college campuses.” Results were consistent with the worldview conflict hypothesis. 
Conservatives expressed more intolerance towards left-wing targets and liberals expressed more 
intolerance towards right-wing targets; these perceptions were statistically mediated by the 
extent the target groups were perceived to threaten the country as a whole. The main effect of 
ideology was slightly negative and not differ from zero (Crawford, Jussim, & Pilanski, 2014), 
providing no support for the traditional hypothesis. 
At the same time, Wetherell, Brandt, and Reyna (2013) conducted two conceptually 
identical studies. They averaged together American participants’ identification as a social liberal 
or conservative and as an economic liberal or conservative to assess overall ideological 
identification. Then they measured support for discrimination against both liberal (e.g., leftist 
protestors) and conservative (e.g., Tea Party protestors) target groups. For example, one item 
from their measure read, ‘‘I can see how defacing the property of leftist protestors could be 
justified.” In both studies, they found that liberals were more likely to support discrimination 
against conservatives and that conservatives were more likely to support discrimination against 
liberals, consistent with the worldview conflict hypothesis. These effects were mediated by the 
perception that the target groups violated the values of the participants. There was no evidence 
that the effect was stronger for conservatives, providing no support for the traditional hypothesis.  
At the same time, Chambers, Schlenker, and Collisson (2013) studied how liberals and 
conservatives express prejudice for all of the target groups in the American National Election 
Studies. They found that liberals express more prejudice towards conservative groups (e.g., 
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Christian fundamentalists, Anti-abortionists, Wealthy people) and that conservatives express 
more prejudice towards liberal groups (e.g., Gays and lesbians, Feminists, Environmentalists) as 
assessed with feeling thermometers. Going further, they showed that the typical association 
between conservatism and prejudice towards African Americans does not emerge when African 
American targets are specified to be conservative. In these conditions, liberals express more 
prejudice. The results were consistent with the worldview conflict hypothesis and were 
inconsistent with the traditional hypothesis. 
Other Consistent Evidence 
These three first papers were published by independent research groups without contact 
with one another. Yet, they developed similar theoretical models, conducted conceptually 
identical experiments, and came to the same overall conclusion (for an early summary of this 
work, see Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014). These initial findings were 
replicated by multiple research groups across different time periods, samples, and countries (e.g., 
Crawford, 2014; Crawford, Kay, & Duke, 2015; Henry & Napier, 2017; Lassetter & Neel, 2019; 
Mason, 2018a; Schepisi, Panasiti, Porciello, Bufalari, & Aglioti, 2019; Yancey, 2010). Just as 
people express prejudice towards those with a different ideological identification, they also find 
people with different ideological views less interesting romantically (Mallinas, Crawford, & 
Cole, 2018), form fewer friendships (Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015) and romantic 
relationships (Huber & Malhotra, 2017) with them, and express more hostility toward people 
with differing views in the (academic) workplace (Honeycutt & Fredberg, 2017). These negative 
opinions and emotions towards dissimilar others extend to political elites; both liberals and 
conservatives express contempt, disgust, and anger towards politicians with dissimilar 
worldviews (Steiger, Reyna, Wetherell, & Iverson, 2019), and also express respect for authorities 
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from their own point of view (Frimer, Gaucher, & Schaefer, 2014). Across diverse research 
groups, methodologies, and samples, we now have clear evidence that the data from studies 
assessing ideological identification are primarily supportive of the worldview conflict hypothesis 
and not the traditional hypothesis. 
Making Precise Predictions 
At this point, the worldview conflict hypothesis predicts and the data show that 
conservatives express prejudice towards groups perceived to be liberal and liberals express 
prejudice towards groups perceived to be conservative. These predictions and data contradict the 
traditional hypothesis, but they were still relatively underdeveloped. For example, can we predict 
when conservatives will express a little bit more prejudice than liberals compared to when they 
will express a lot more prejudice than liberals? That is, can we move from mere directional 
predictions to predictions that also specify the size of the effect? 
The worldview conflict hypothesis predicts that people will express prejudice towards 
individuals and groups who are perceived to hold conflicting attitudes and values. However, 
some individuals and groups are perceived to more clearly hold conflicting attitudes and values 
than other groups. Although it might feel obvious to our participants that Fundamentalist 
Christians hold values diametrically opposed to political liberals, it might be less obvious that 
this is also the case for rich people. Indeed, people’s spontaneous perceptions of groups differ 
along a continuous “belief” dimension of stereotypes that closely maps onto the perceived 
liberalness or conservativeness of the group, with some groups being perceived as clearly liberal 
or conservative, whereas other groups are more ambiguously perceived (Koch et al., 2016). We 
expect that the extent a group is perceived to hold conflicting worldviews is associated with the 
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amount of prejudice expressed. This is consistent with Byrne’s (1969) findings and theorizing 
decades ago: The greater the proportion of (dis)similarity the greater the (dis)liking. 
We tested if we can predict the size and direction of the ideology-prejudice association 
using information about the perceived ideology of the target group in samples of American 
participants (for full details, see Brandt, 2017). First, a model was developed using the 2012 
American National Election Studies combined with ratings of target groups’ perceived ideology 
from a separate sample of American adults. Using multilevel models, expressed prejudice (as 
assessed with feeling thermometers) towards 24 groups was regressed on the perceived ideology 
of the target group, the participants’ ideological identification, the interaction between perceived 
ideology and participants’ ideology, and demographic covariates (all variables were rescaled to 
range from 0 to 1). The main effect of participant ideology and the interaction give us the 
necessary information to build a model to predict future data. That model is  
?̂? = 0.022 − 1.420(𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦) 
In this model, ?̂? is the predicted size and direction of the association between ideology 
and prejudice for a target group. 0.022 is the model’s prediction for the association between 
ideology and prejudice when the target group is perceived to be ideologically neutral (a 0 on our 
measure of perceived ideology). The rest of the model, −1.420(target ideology), indicates that as 
the target group is perceived as more conservative (i.e., perceived ideology increases) the 
association between ideology and prejudice becomes more negative (i.e., liberals express more 
prejudice). Conversely, as the target group is perceived as more liberal (i.e., perceived ideology 
decreases), the association between ideology and prejudice becomes more positive (i.e., 
conservatives express more prejudice). 
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In addition to this “ideology-only” model, we also built other models using the same 
data from the 2012 American National Election Studies. First, we tested a conceptually similar 
model that assessed the perceived conventionalism of the target group. Because perceived 
ideology and perceived conventionalism are highly correlated (r = .85), we treat these as 
conceptually similar models.  
More importantly, we also tested the ideology-only model against models that included 
the perceived status of the target groups. Just as people spontaneously categorize groups based 
on their perceived ideological beliefs, people also spontaneously categorize people in terms of 
their perceived social status (Koch et al., 2016; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). There is good 
reason to believe that social status is a dimension that would predict the size and direction of the 
ideology-prejudice association. For example, conservatives tend to support policies and endorse 
moral values that bolster high status groups at the expense of low status groups (Graham, Haidt, 
& Nosek, 2009; Sidanius & Pratto, 2001). This may lead conservatives to express more prejudice 
towards low status and disadvantaged groups compared to liberals (Duckitt, 2006). Consistent 
with this, there is some evidence that liberals are more likely to promote the success of members 
of low status groups (Kteily, Rocklage, McClanahan, & Ho, 2019) and hold biases in favor of 
low status groups (Winegard, Clark, Hasty, & Baumeister, 2018). Moreover, people who hold 
anti-egalitarian values (something that is correlated with conservatism) express more empathy 
for low status groups (Lucas & Kteily, 2018). Therefore, models with only ideology or only 
conventionalism were also compared to a model with status. 
The last type of model compared was a model assessing the perceived choice people 
had in belonging to a group. Although the amount of choice people have in belonging to any 
group is not always clear, people perceive others to have more choice in belonging to some 
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groups (e.g., feminists, Christian fundamentalists) than to other groups (e.g., Women, Whites). 
One could predict that conservatives will be more likely to express prejudice towards members 
of low choice groups than liberals because prejudice can help reinforce the boundaries between 
groups (Haslam, Bastian, Bain, & Kashima, 2006), something that conservatives care about 
(Hodson & Dhont, 2015). Therefore, models with only ideology, only conventionalism, or only 
status were also compared to a model with only choice. Models with individual predictors were 
also compared to models with all possible predictors (with the exception that ideology and 
conventionalism were not included in the same models due to their high correlation) and to a null 
model. 
Table 1 
Predictive models and parameters developed and tested in Brandt (2017) and Figures 2 and 3. 
Model 
1. Ideology only: ?̂? = 0.022 – 1.420(target ideology) 
2. Ideology, status, and choice: ?̂? = 0.016 – 1.505(target ideology) + 0.128(target status) + 0.072(target choice) 
3. Conventionalism only: ?̂? = 0.157 – 1.947(target conventionalism) 
4. Conventionalism, status, and choice: ?̂? = 0.166 – 1.827(target conventionalism) – 0.076(target status) – 0.185(target choice) 
5. Status only: ?̂? = 0.001 – 0.846(target status) 
6. Choice only: ?̂? = 0.041 - .398(target choice) 
7. Null: ?̂? = 0 
Note: ?̂? is the predicted association between ideology and prejudice. All predictors and outcomes 
were scaled to range from 0 to 1. Predictors were midpoint centered, so that the intercept is the 
predicted association between ideology and prejudice for target groups who were perceived to 
have moderate levels of ideology, conventionalism, status, and choice. 
 
After building these models using the 2012 American National Election Studies, the 
models were tested in new datasets. Specifically, the model-predicted association between 
ideology and prejudice was determined by solving the equations in Table 1. Then, the association 
between ideology and prejudice was calculated in four different datasets, including datasets that 
included target groups that the model had not seen before (Target Group N ranged from 9 to 42). 
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We then calculated the squared difference between the predicted values and the model estimated 
values (i.e., the squared errors). Across all four of these studies, the ideology-only model 
consistently outperformed the status-only and the choice-only models by having small squared 
errors than the other models. Moreover, when meta-analyzing across all four of the studies, the 
ideology-only model also outperformed the models including conventionalism. Although the 
ideology-only model did not differ from the ideology, status, and choice model, the ideology-
only model is more parsimonious. It appears that the ideology-only model “wins.”  
To give an example of the power of this predictive model, we examined how well the 
model – developed with the 2012 American National Election Study – predicts the observed 
estimates from the 2016 American National Election Study (reported in detail in the preprint of 
Brandt, 2018). Figure 2 includes all of the groups in the 2016 American National Election Study 
for which we had ratings of their perceived ideology, conventionalism, status, and choice. The 
groups are ordered from perceived as most liberal (top) to most conservative (bottom). The black 
dots with error bars are the observed associations and the other markers are the estimates from 
the models. Figure 3 shows the predictive errors for each of the models in Table 1. As is evident, 
the ideology-only model has the smallest prediction errors and is the most parsimonious model. 
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Figure 2. Comparison of the predicted and observed estimates for the association between 
ideology and prejudice toward the target groups. The observed estimates were obtained 
using ordinary least squares regression, adjusting for age, gender, education, income, and 
race-ethnicity. The predicted estimates were obtained from the models described in Brandt 
(2017). The dashed vertical line represents the predictions of the null model. All variables 
were coded to have a range of 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The target 
groups are ordered from the group perceived as most liberal (top) to the group perceived 
as most conservative (bottom). Figure and caption originally published in Brandt (2018, 
https://psyarxiv.com/buw8f). 
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Figure 3. Box plots of the seven models’ squared prediction error for the association 
between ideology and prejudice. The right and left edges of the box indicate the 75th and 
25th percentiles, respectively, and the black line near the middle of the box is the 50th 
percentile. The whiskers represent the lowest and highest data points within 1.5 times the 
interquartile range of the lowest quartile and the highest quartile, respectively. The circles 
represent outliers. The ranges of p-values indicate the values obtained when the two 
ideology models and the two conventionalism models were compared individually with the 
status-only, choice-only, and null models. Figure and caption originally published in 
Brandt (2018, https://psyarxiv.com/buw8f). 
 
The prediction studies teach us several things. First, it is possible to anticipate the size 
and direction of the ideology-prejudice association merely by knowing the perceived ideology of 
the target group. Second, perceived status and perceived choice are not viable predictors of the 
size and direction of the ideology-prejudice association. In combination, these points can be used 
to plan new studies about the associations between ideology and prejudice. Researchers, for 
example, often claim that it is difficult to know what effect sizes to expect. The ideology-only 
predictive model will give you a pretty accurate answer.  
The prediction studies also teach us things by pointing out instances where the model 
fails. The clearest and most consistent example of this is when the target group is Muslims. 
Muslims are perceived to be relatively conservative and conventional. At the same time, the 
conservatives in our samples tended to express prejudice towards Muslims, consistent with prior 
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work (Echebarria-Echabe & Guede, 2007; Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009). One challenge for 
future work will be to test why Muslims are an exception to the general trend and to test if such 
an explanation improves the model fit across all groups. A likely possibility is that although 
Muslims may be perceived as conservative, they may be seen as conservative in terms of a belief 
system that is different from (and perhaps competing with) the American conservative belief 
system. Integrating these nuances is one necessary step for future work. 
The Multiple Dimensions of Politics and Prejudice 
Multiple Dimensions of Politics? A large proportion of our work has adopted the 
dominant view of political ideology as a unidimensional construct: People can be more or less 
liberal or conservative. This follows a tradition within social psychology to focus on people’s 
identification as a liberal or a conservative and whether this single dimension is associated with 
various psychological constructs, such as personality and perceived threat (e.g., Jost, 2006, 
2017). Such a unidimensional approach to ideology does capture a fair amount of variance in 
political beliefs in the United States and some Western European countries (Azevedo, Jost, 
Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019). However, it now appears that such a unidimensional approach is 
inadequate.  
It should perhaps not be surprising that a single dimension to politics is inadequate. For 
example, the dual-process model of prejudice builds on two ideological worldviews: right-wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). The 
conservatism as motivated social cognition model posits two factors underlying conservatism: 
resistance to change and acceptance of inequality (Jost et al., 2003). Schwartz’s model of 
abstract values consists of two overarching dimensions: conservation-openness to change and 
self-enhancement-self-transcendence (Schwartz, 1994). Moral foundations theory clusters their 
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five foundations into two overarching conceptual factors: binding foundations and 
individualizing foundations (Graham et al., 2013). Factor analyses and other multiple 
dimensional analyses of political policies often identify (at least) two factors: social issues and 
economic issues (Everett, 2013; Feldman & Johnston, 2014). Across these different domains 
there then appears to be, at least, two dimensions to political beliefs. One dimension is related to 
social conventions and the other is related to economic inequality.  
Proposing two distinct dimensions of political beliefs does not imply that the 
dimensions are uncorrelated. Indeed, the correlation between social and economic issues in the 
United States and the United Kingdom tends to be relatively high (especially compared to social 
psychology standards; Azevedo et al., 2019). Instead, it should imply that, at least in some 
settings, the two dimensions have different predictors, correlates, and outcomes. Consistent with 
this, different dimensions of worldviews, values, moral foundations, and political policies have 
different correlations with other relevant constructs (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Feather & 
McKee, 2012; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014). For example, 
social dominance orientation is more consistently associated with individualizing foundations, 
whereas right-wing authoritarianism is more consistently associated with binding foundations 
(Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014); the resistance to social change is related to higher levels 
of perceived legitimacy across contexts, whereas the acceptance of inequality is only associated 
with higher levels of perceived legitimacy in unequal contexts (Brandt & Reyna, 2017); and the 
personality and motivational correlates of social and economic conservatism differ (e.g., 
Crowson, 2009; Malka, Soto, Inzlicht, & Lelkes, 2014; Schoonvelde, Brosius, Schumacher, & 
Bakker, 2019). Moreover, outside of the United States, the typical positive association between 
social and economic policies does not emerge; in some cases, the relationship is clearly negative 
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(Malka, Lelkes, & Soto, 2019). Taken together, there is good reason to suspect that the 
unidimensional approach to ideology is unlikely to capture all of the relevant nuances of 
worldview conflict. 
Multiple Hypotheses for Multiple Dimensions. When extending the worldview 
conflict hypothesis to multiple dimensions, the hypothesis becomes more specified. Specifically, 
when assessing social political ideology, the worldview conflict should be most salient on the 
social dimension and when assessing economic political ideology, the worldview conflict should 
be the most salient on the economic dimension. And so, the dimension specific worldview 
conflict hypothesis predicts that social (but not economic) conservatism should predict prejudice 
towards socially liberal targets (e.g., atheists), but that social (but not economic) liberalism 
should predict prejudice towards socially conservative targets (e.g., Evangelical Christians). 
However, economic (but not social) conservatism should predict prejudice towards economically 
liberal targets (e.g., welfare recipients), and economic (but not social) liberalism should predict 
prejudice towards economically conservative targets (e.g., investment bankers) (Crawford, 
Brandt, Inbar, Chambers, & Motyl, 2017). 
There are, however, at least two other plausible hypotheses to consider. First is the 
social primacy hypothesis. This hypothesis is similar to the dimension specific worldview 
conflict hypothesis, but it predicts that the effects will be larger on the social dimension. The 
social dimension may lead to larger effects because social issues are often less technical and 
more closely tied to symbolic and value-laden beliefs than are economic issues (Carmines & 
Stimson, 1980; Johnston & Wronski, 2015). This might suggest that people more readily 
experience strong and intuitive gut-reactions along that social dimension compared to the 
economic dimension. Consistent with this idea, personal values more closely underlie social 
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issues compared to economic issues (Malka et al., 2014), social issues are more closely 
correlated with people’s ideological identifications (Feldman & Johnston, 2014), and the most 
ideologically divisive moral foundations are those related to social issues (Graham, Haidt, & 
Nosek, 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).  
The other plausible hypothesis is the social specific traditional hypothesis. This 
hypothesis predicts that social conservatives will express prejudice, but that social liberals will 
not. That is, this hypothesis is the traditional hypothesis, but limited to the social domain. Social 
conservatives may be especially primed to express prejudice because the needs and motivations 
thought to motivate prejudice among conservatives generally (e.g., need for closure) are more 
clearly related to social conservatism (e.g. Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Malka et al., 2014; van 
Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). These same needs are often weakly related or unrelated (van 
Hiel et al., 2004) and sometimes negatively related (Malka et al., 2014) to economic 
conservatism (see also Johnston, Levine, & Federico, 2017). Because of these less clear 
associations with economic conservatism, this hypothesis is agnostic about the associations 
between economic political ideology and prejudice. 
Testing Three Dimension Specific Hypotheses. The three dimension specific 
hypotheses have now been tested in 10 samples from the United States and Poland using several 
different measures of prejudice, including feeling thermometers, the implicit association test, and 
the dictator game (Crawford et al., 2017; Czarnek, Szwed, & Kossowska, 2019). People’s 
positions on social and economic dimensions of political ideology were measured using people’s 
self-identification as liberal or conservative on social and economic dimensions, or with people’s 
support for various social and economic political policies. And separate samples rated the target 
groups on their perceived social and economic ideologies. In the United States, these two 
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perceptions were highly correlated (r[16] = .88, Crawford et al., 2017, Study 1), whereas in 
Poland they were not (r[13] = .05, Czarnek et al., 2019, Study 1). This is consistent with work 
suggesting that ideology is more unidimensional in the United States compared to other contexts, 
such as Post-Communist countries (Malka et al., 2019). The question from our perspective is, are 
people’s scores on the two dimensions of political ideology associated with prejudice towards 
different types of groups based on those groups’ positions on the two dimensions? 
This is the case. Across the 10 samples, there was evidence that the specific dimensions 
mattered when it came to prejudice. On the social dimension, social conservatism was associated 
with prejudice towards groups perceived to be socially liberal, whereas social liberalism was 
associated with prejudice towards groups perceived to be social conservative. On the economic 
dimension, economic conservatism was associated with prejudice towards groups perceived to be 
economic liberals, whereas economic liberalism was associated with prejudice towards groups 
perceived to be economic conservatives (Crawford et al., 2017; Czarnek et al., 2019). These 
effects were exacerbated when the targets were described as extreme, suggesting the perceived 
worldview conflict (sometimes measured in these studies as value violations) accounts for the 
effects (Czarnek et al., 2019). The interaction effects on the opposing dimension (e.g., 
participants’ social ideology interacting with economic ideology) were substantially weaker and 
inconsistent across studies, if they emerged at all. 
Taken as a whole, the results refute the social specific traditional hypothesis. It is also 
possible to compare the dimension-specific worldview conflict hypothesis with the social 
primacy hypothesis, which predicts that the effects will be largest on the social dimension. The 
evidence is mixed across the studies (e.g., see the summary in Crawford et al., 2017, Table 6) 
and so it is not yet possible to come to firm conclusions on this particular issue. However, we 
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should note that the social primacy hypothesis has the most support in Crawford and colleagues 
(2017) studies, and also finds support in Czarnek and colleagues work (2019). Therefore, at this 
point, we suggest that the social domain is the domain most consistently associated with 
worldview conflict; however, in different cultural contexts or points in history this may change. 
Party Identification and Prejudice 
At the same time we were developing our work on the worldview conflict hypothesis, 
researchers in political science were identifying and investigating the growing tendency for 
Americans to express dislike for the opposing political party (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; 
Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019). In these studies, participants 
express their identification with a political party (typically, Democrats or Republicans) and 
express their prejudice towards the out party (typically, using feeling thermometers and measures 
of social distance). They find that people like their inparty more than their outparty, an effect 
dubbed affective polarization. Affective polarization has been growing since at least the 1970s in 
the United States, in part because people take cues from the polarization of political elites 
(Abramowitz & Webster, 2016) and have fewer cross-cutting identities (e.g., racial, religious, 
and political identities are increasingly less likely to align; Mason, 2015). Evidence of affective 
polarization has been found using self-report measures (Iyengar et al., 2012), but also with the 
implicit association test (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015), economic games (Carlin & Love, 2018; 
Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Tappin & McKay, in press; Westwood, Iyengar, Walgrave, 
Leonisio, Miller, & Strijbis, 2018), real-life economic decisions (e.g., hiring;  Gift & Gift, 2015; 
McConnell, Margalit, Malhotra, & Levendusky, 2018; Michelitch, 2015), measures of subtle and 
blatant dehumanization (Casses, in press), and endorsements of partisan violence and terrorism 
(although absolute rates are relatively low; Kalmoe & Mason, 2019). Evidence for affective 
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polarization has been found in countries outside of North America, including Belgium, the 
United Kingdom, El Salvador, and South Africa among others (e.g., Carlin & Love, 2018; 
Westwood et al., 2018). Importantly for our purposes, affective polarization holds for Democrats 
(and left-wing parties in general) and Republicans (and right-wing parties in general) providing 
support for the worldview conflict hypothesis and evidence against the traditional hypothesis.  
Affective polarization researchers typically just focus on evaluations of the outparty and 
its members. That is, they do not focus on the range of possible target groups and often use 
measures that invoke political elites (Druckman & Levendusky, in press). There are two 
exceptions. The first examines how party identification is associated with feeling thermometers 
of target groups included in the 2016 American National Election Study, with the basic idea that 
partisan differences should also emerge for feeling thermometers for groups who are merely 
associated with the outparty (Mason, 2018b). And this is indeed what was found. Republicans 
not only dislike the Democratic party, but they also dislike feminists, labor unions, and 
transgender people. Democrats not only dislike the Republican party, but they also dislike 
Christian fundamentalists, rich people, and big business. The second finds that partisan 
differences in prejudice towards social groups has increased over time, just like differences in 
prejudice towards the outparty (Robison & Moskowitz, in press). Moreover, in longitudinal data 
they find that social group prejudices may drive party prejudices. 
Although these studies demonstrate that partisan identification can inspire prejudice 
towards groups that appear merely affiliated with the outparty, it does not provide a way to 
understand where researchers should expect the largest differences. Just as is the case with 
ideological identification, the worldview conflict hypothesis can be used to predict the size and 
direction of the party identification and prejudice association. In a country such as the United 
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States, where party identification and ideological identification are increasingly connected (e.g., 
Abramowitz & Saunders, 1998), the association between party identification and prejudice 
should track the perceived ideology of the target group.  
We tested this by developing predictive models, like those used in Brandt (2017) and 
described above. We used the 2012 American National Election Study to develop 6 models (plus 
a null model) of the association between party identification and prejudice. These models are 
reported in Table 2. Then, we tested the accuracy of these model predictions by comparing the 
predictions to observed data from the 2016 American National Election Study. The results are 
presented in Figures 4 and 5. The models with the smallest errors were those that used the 
perceived ideology of the target group as the predictor. Models with status or choice were not 
successful. This result suggests that the models developed for perceiver ideology and prejudice 
work well for understanding the size and direction of the association between perceiver party 
identification and prejudice.  
Table 2 
Predictive models and parameters developed and tested here and Figures 4 and 5 for the 
association between party identification and prejudice. 
Model 
1. Ideology only: ?̂? = 0.018 – 0.753 (target ideology) 
2. Ideology, status, and choice: ?̂? = 0.016 – 0.769 (target ideology) + 0.005(target status) + 0048 (target choice) 
3. Conventionalism only: ?̂? = 0.103 – 0.986 (target conventionalism) 
4. Conventionalism, status, and choice: ?̂? = 0.096 – 0.795(target conventionalism) – 0.300(target status) – 0.147(target choice) 
5. Status only: ?̂? = 0.001 – 0.573(target status) 
6. Choice only: ?̂? = 0.021 - .175(target choice) 
7. Null: ?̂? = 0 
Note: ?̂? is the predicted association between party identification and prejudice. All predictors and 
outcomes scaled to range from 0 to 1. Predictors are midpoint centered, so that the intercept is 
the predicted association between party identification and prejudice for target groups who are 
perceived to have moderate levels of ideology, conventionalism, status, and choice. Models 
developed using the 2012 American National Election Study and the group ratings from Study 2 
of Brandt (2017). 
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Figure 4. Comparison of the predicted and observed estimates for the association between 
party identification and prejudice toward the target groups. The observed estimates were 
obtained using ordinary least squares regression, adjusting for age, gender, education, 
income, and race-ethnicity. The predicted estimates were obtained from the models 
described in Table 2. Group ratings used to make model predictions are from Study 2 of 
Brandt (2017). The dashed vertical line represents the predictions of the null model. All 
variables were coded to have a range of 1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
The target groups are ordered from the group perceived as most liberal (top) to the group 
perceived as most conservative (bottom).  
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Figure 5. Box plots of the seven models’ squared prediction error for the association 
between party identification and prejudice. The right and left edges of the box indicate the 
75th and 25th percentiles, respectively, and the black line near the middle of the box is the 
50th percentile. The whiskers represent the lowest and highest data points within 1.5 times 
the interquartile range of the lowest quartile and the highest quartile, respectively. The 
circles represent outliers. The ranges of p-values indicate the values obtained when the two 
ideology models and the two conventionalism models were compared individually with the 
status-only, choice-only, and null models.  
 
The models developed and tested above are important for moving work on affective 
polarization beyond testing how prejudice is expressed towards the outparty to how prejudice is 
expressed towards groups who are merely affiliated with the outparty and its ideology in some 
way. As with the models of ideology and prejudice, these models can be used to make 
predictions about target groups the model hasn’t seen, as well as highlight those target groups 
(e.g., Muslims) who are not well explained by the model. Perhaps more interestingly, by moving 
affective polarization work beyond outparty prejudice, it makes it possible to think about how 
affective polarization can impact attitudes outside party politics.  
Religion and Prejudice 
Politics is just one domain where worldview conflict might occur. Conflicts over 
religious beliefs might be some of the longest running worldview conflicts. Such conflicts pose a 
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puzzle because many world religions are associated with values of mercy, love for others, and 
tolerance (e.g., Schumann, McGregor, Nash, & Ross, 2014; Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 
2004). Yet, many scholars have found that religion is associated with forms of prejudice (e.g., 
Brandt & Reyna, 2010, 2014; Jackson & Esses, 1997). We build on this work and suggest that 
the prejudices of the religious and non-religious can be understood through the lens of worldview 
conflict. 
We have tested the worldview conflict hypothesis in the context of religious 
fundamentalism (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). Prior work suggests that religious 
fundamentalists express more prejudice than non-fundamentalists because fundamentalists are 
more closed-minded (Brandt & Reyna, 2010), have higher needs for structure (Hill et al., 2010), 
and hold authoritarian values (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2014; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001). 
However, this prior work used a relatively limited range of target groups. In our work we 
expanded the range of target groups. Pre-testing showed that Catholics, Tea Party activists, 
Conservatives, and Christians are seen as similar to religious fundamentalists in the United 
States. Atheists, gay men and lesbians, liberals, and feminists are seen as similar to people who 
are not religious fundamentalists. In both representative and convenience samples we found that 
people scoring higher on an ad-hoc measure of fundamentalism or Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s 
(1992) religious fundamentalism scale expressed more prejudice towards groups dissimilar to 
fundamentalists, whereas people scoring lower on the scale expressed more prejudice towards 
groups similar to fundamentalists. This effect emerged on feeling thermometers, measures of 
social distance, and a measure of dehumanization. For both fundamentalists and non-
fundamentalists, results were mediated by perceptions of threat, including threats to values and 
the rights of other groups. These patterns are in line with the worldview conflict hypothesis. 
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There is a complication, however. Although the pattern is in line with the worldview 
conflict hypothesis, we did find larger effects for fundamentalists than non-fundamentalists. This 
might suggest that, although worldview conflict-like processes play a role for fundamentalists 
and non-fundamentalists, the various processes underlying the traditional hypothesis may also be 
at work. Another potential explanation is that it is not clear what it means to be a non-
fundamentalist. Participants can score low on Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s measure because they 
are religious but non-fundamentalist or because they are not-religious. Therefore, we conducted a 
study using Duriez and colleagues (Duriez, Soenens, & Hutsebaut, 2005) post-critical belief 
scale that separates out the type of belief (religious vs. non-religious) from the style of belief 
(rigid vs. flexible) and the same target groups as before (Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017). Here 
we found clear evidence for the worldview conflict hypothesis. People who were religious 
expressed prejudice towards groups who were seen as dissimilar to religious people. People who 
were not religious expressed prejudice towards groups who were seen as dissimilar to non-
religious people. These two effect were similar in size. The index of belief style, however, was 
not clearly associated with prejudice.  
Conceptually similar results have been found by other scholars. For example, 
Kossowska and colleagues (Kossowska, Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, & Sekerdej, 2017) found that 
dogmatic religious people expressed prejudice towards atheists, whereas dogmatic atheists 
expressed prejudice towards Catholics in a Polish sample. Other scholars have examined 
participants who identify as atheist, agnostic, and as Christian from the United Kingdom, France, 
and Spain (Uzarevic, Saroglou, & Muñoz-García, in press). They found, across the three 
countries, that non-religious people (both atheists and agnostics) expressed more prejudice 
towards anti-liberal groups (e.g., antigay activists, fundamentalists) and less prejudice towards 
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Catholics compared to Christian participants. A final study from the United States showed that 
religious fundamentalism was associated with prejudice towards Blacks, but only when the 
measure is framed as a violation of fundamentalist values (Brandt & Reyna, 2014). Combined, 
these results provide clear support for the worldview conflict hypothesis across multiple 
countries.  
Personality 
We find consistent support for the worldview conflict hypothesis in multiple countries 
and across political and religious domains. In some ways, this is strange. We find that people 
with both progressive and traditional worldviews express prejudice towards groups with different 
worldviews and values. Yet, there is good evidence that personalities and motivations that likely 
increase prejudice also characterize people with traditional worldviews (e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 
2008). Moreover, according to some theoretical accounts (e.g., Hodson & Dhont, 2015), these 
individual differences in personality, cognitive styles, and cognitive abilities form the basis of 
prejudice, such that the individual differences lead to more traditional worldviews which, in turn, 
lead to prejudice. This is a paradox. The tension between this prior work and our own findings 
led us to consider other types of characteristics beyond politics and religion that had traditionally 
been tied to prejudice. Specifically, we examined the Big Five personality traits, disgust 
sensitivity, and cognitive ability. 
The Big Five Traits  
An obvious first step was to re-examine the relationship between personality traits and 
prejudice, especially through the lens of the Big Five theory of personality (Costa & Macrae, 
1985), using our heterogeneous groups approach. In the literature, two traits in particular were 
tied to prejudice: low Openness to Experience and low Agreeableness. Decades of individual 
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studies had been meta-analytically summarized by Sibley and Duckitt (2008) confirming that 
low Openness and low Agreeableness were the only two Big Five personality traits reliably 
associated with prejudice (meta-analytic effect size estimates of r = -.30 and -.22, respectively). 
These traits are connected to prejudice via their associations with people’s worldviews: 
Openness and Agreeableness are differentially related to right-wing authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation, respectively, and effects of Openness on prejudice are mediated through 
right-wing authoritarianism whereas effects of Agreeableness on prejudice are mediated through 
social dominance orientation (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).  
As in the literature on politics and religion, however, work linking low Openness and 
low Agreeableness to prejudice was primarily focused on low status, disadvantaged target 
groups. In Duckitt and Sibley’s (2008) meta-analysis, target groups were either ethnic minority 
groups or women, or included studies of generalized prejudice. However, studies of generalized 
prejudice, which purport to examine the relationship between personality and prejudice toward 
an array of groups, only include low status target groups. For example, common measures of 
generalized prejudice include prejudice towards racial minorities, women, gay men and lesbians, 
the disabled, and immigrants (Akrami et al., 2011; Akrami et al., 2009; Ekehammar & Akrami, 
2003; 2007; Ekehammar et al., 2004).  
We therefore conducted a series of studies examining not only the relationship between 
Big Five traits and prejudice toward a more heterogeneous array of targets, but also examining 
what types of target traits or characteristics might moderate the relationship between personality 
and prejudice. In an initial series of four studies (Brandt et al., 2015), we focused solely on 
Openness to experience. These studies suggested that both people low and high in Openness 
expressed prejudice towards groups with conflicting worldviews. Such worldview conflict 
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partially centers around perceived conventionalism. Specifically, whereas low Openness was 
associated with prejudice towards socially unconventional groups (e.g., atheists, gay men and 
lesbians), high Openness was associated with prejudice towards socially conventional groups 
(e.g., Catholics, military personnel). Thus, rather than Openness functioning as a dispositional 
trait that orients people toward greater Openness to differences generally, it directs prejudice 
toward dissimilar groups—people low in Openness are more conventional and people high in 
Openness are more unconventional.  
These initial findings suggested that the link between personality and prejudice is not 
consistent across target groups. Moreover, they provided a hint that, when associations between 
personality traits and generalized prejudice have emerged, such observations might be due to the 
relatively narrow array of groups used in measures of generalized prejudice. A broader 
conceptualization of generalized prejudice that includes (for example) conventional and 
unconventional target groups might have different personality traits that underpin it. 
To explore these ideas and build on the finding of Brandt et al. (2015), we meta-
analyzed four studies on the relationship between all of the Big Five traits and prejudice towards 
a heterogeneous array of groups (Crawford & Brandt, 2019). This allows us to assess how 
personality is related to a narrow conceptualization of generalized prejudice (consistent with 
prior work; e.g., Akrami et al., 2009, 2011) and how personality is related to a broad 
conceptualization of generalized prejudice that contains many more groups. In addition, this 
approach would allow us to a) determine whether effects of Agreeableness on prejudice 
depended on target characteristics (like Openness did) or whether its effects were robust to 
variation in target characteristics, and b) whether the other three traits that had not been linked to 
prejudice in the past might emerge as predictors when using a wider variety of targets.  
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The results for all five traits are summarized in Figure 6. We focus on the results of 
Agreeableness and Openness due to their robust association with generalized prejudice in past 
research. Consistent with that prior work, we found that low Openness (pr = -.17, 95%CI [-.20, -
.14]) and low Agreeableness (pr  = -.25, 95%CI [-.33, -.17]) were both associated with higher 
levels of narrow generalized prejudice. When including a broader array of groups, we find that 
the link between Openness and prejudice shrinks to near zero (pr  = -.03, 95%CI [-.07, -.001]), 
whereas the link between Agreeableness and prejudice remains the same (pr  = -.23, 95%CI [-
.31, -.16]). Neuroticism (pr  = -.00, 95%CI [-.05, .05]) and Conscientiousness (pr  = .02, 95%CI 
[-.01, .06]) were not associated with broad generalized prejudice and low Extraversion was 
weakly associated with higher levels of broad generalized prejudice (pr  = -.09, 95%CI [-.12, -
.05]). 




Figure 6. Partial correlations (95% confidence intervals) for the association between 
personality traits and broad and narrow conceptualizations of generalized prejudice. Solid 
vertical dashed lines represent small and medium effect sizes. Estimates are from 
Crawford and Brandt (2019). Groups such as gay men and lesbians, poor people, and 
Muslims were included in the measure of narrow generalized prejudice. These groups, in 
addition to groups such as atheists, rich people, and Mormons, were included in the 
measure of broad generalized prejudice. The full list of groups is available in the 
supplemental materials of Crawford and Brandt (2019).  
 
We also examined whether several target group characteristics (ideology, status, 
warmth, choice of group membership) central to social perception (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; 
Koch, Imhoff, Dotsch, Unkelbach, & Alves, 2016; Weiner, 1995) along with traits we thought 
might serve as markers of dissimilarity (e.g., assertiveness for trait Extraversion), might 
moderate the effects of Big Five traits on prejudice. Perceived ideology moderated effects of 
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Openness and Conscientiousness on prejudice, with those low in Openness and high in 
Conscientiousness being more prejudiced against liberal targets, and those high in Openness and 
low in Conscientiousness more prejudiced against conservative targets. Whereas there were 
some factors that moderated the Agreeableness-prejudice relationship, these factors only 
strengthened or weakened the relationship, rather than eliminating or reversing it.3  
It might be possible that personality’s role in worldview conflict is as a moderator. That 
is, for people with different personality traits, such as high Openness, the link between 
worldview conflict and prejudice may be weaker than for people with other personality traits, 
such as low Openness. We have tested this in Studies 3 and 4 in Brandt and colleagues (2015) 
work on Openness and prejudice. In Study 3, we were surprised to find that worldview conflict 
was more strongly linked with prejudice among people high in Openness. However, in Study 4 
we found that worldview conflict was similarly linked with prejudice among people high and 
low in Openness. Therefore, we do not find consistent evidence that Openness moderates the link 
between worldview conflict and prejudice, although future studies may reveal more consistent 
effects. 
Together, this work showed that (a) for both Openness and Conscientiousness, the link 
between personality and prejudice is determined by the perceived ideology of the target groups 
and (b) low Agreeableness tends to be related to more prejudice across a range of target groups. 
The results for Openness and Conscientiousness helps resolve our paradox. Low Openness and 
high Conscientiousness do not uniquely prime-the-pump for prejudice. Instead both high and low 
                                                 
3 An interesting, but unexpected and somewhat tangential finding was that Extraversion’s association with prejudice 
was moderated by the status of the target group. We found that low Extraversion was associated with prejudice 
towards high status groups, something that would not have been found using the narrow conceptualization of 
generalized prejudice. 
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levels of Openness and Conscientiousness prime-the-pump for prejudice, just towards different 
groups. 
Disgust Sensitivity 
Disgust sensitivity is a reliable individual difference that captures a propensity to 
experience disgust, and has been linked to a number of pathological conditions (e.g., phobias, 
sexual dysfunction, obsessive compulsive disorder; van Overveld et al., 2011). It is also 
consistently correlated with more conservative worldviews (Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012; 
Smith et al., 2011; Terrizzi et al., 2010). Previous scholarship linked disgust sensitivity to 
intergroup attitudes (Hodson & Dhont, 2015), especially toward sexually non-normative targets 
(e.g., gays and lesbians; Inbar et al., 2009; Terrizzi et al., 2010) and immigrants (Hodson & 
Costello, 2007). This work sees heightened experiences of disgust as related to the behavioral 
immune system (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012), by which the emotion of disgust evolved to protect 
the self and one’s group from potentially harmful contaminants (including the potential 
contamination through interaction with other groups).  
However, the work on disgust sensitivity and prejudice suffers from the same 
shortcomings as much of the work we’ve reviewed: it uses a limited number of target groups. 
Given disgust sensitivity’s link with the purity moral foundation (Wagemans, Brandt, & 
Zeelenberg, 2018) and conservative views about sex (Olatunji, 2008), one group characteristic 
that might be particularly useful for understanding when disgust sensitivity is related to more or 
less prejudice is the extent the groups threaten or uphold traditional sexual morality. In a sample 
of Americans, Crawford, Inbar, and Maloney (2014) examined the relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and prejudice toward groups that varied in whether they threaten (e.g., pro-choice 
political activists) or uphold (e.g., Evangelical Christians) traditional sexual morality. Whereas 
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high disgust sensitivity was associated with prejudice towards groups that threaten traditional 
sexual morality, low disgust sensitivity was associated with prejudice towards groups that uphold 
traditional sexual morality, and to equal degrees. It was less associated with prejudice towards 
left- or right-leaning groups unassociated with sexual morality (e.g. gun rights/gun control 
political activists).  
This work showed that (a) the link between disgust sensitivity and anti-gay attitudes is 
part of a broader set of prejudices towards groups who threaten traditional sexual morality and 
that (b) low levels of disgust sensitivity can also be linked with prejudice, as long as the target 
groups uphold traditional sexual morality. This helps resolve our paradox. Disgust sensitivity 
does not uniquely prime-the-pump for prejudice. Instead both high and low levels of disgust 
sensitivity prime-the-pump for prejudice, just towards different groups.  
Cognitive Ability 
Another individual difference previously associated with prejudice and more 
conservative worldviews is low cognitive ability. For example, in reanalyses of evidence from 
Deary, Batty, and Gale (2008) and Keillor (2010), Hodson and Busseri (2012) show that low 
general intelligence in youth is associated with greater racism in adulthood, and that poor 
abstract reasoning is associated with anti-gay attitudes. This association has been further 
confirmed in a meta-analysis of 23 studies (Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont, Hodson, Schittekatte, & De 
Pauw, 2015). Just as the other domains we have reviewed, the research linking low cognitive 
ability or low intelligence to prejudice has similarly been limited to prejudice towards low status 
or historically disadvantaged groups (e.g., Hello, Scheepers, & Sleegers, 2006). Cognitive ability 
is also related to conservative worldviews (meta-analytic r = -.20; Onraet et al., 2015). Following 
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the results we have reviewed thus far, this suggests that the link between cognitive ability and 
prejudice may be limited to prejudice towards low status and unconventional groups. 
We tested this idea with data from a large sample representative of American adults (N 
= 5,914) that included both a measure of verbal intelligence along with measures of prejudice 
(feeling thermometers) against a heterogeneous array of 24 groups (Brandt & Crawford, 2016). 
There was no relationship between cognitive ability and prejudice overall. Instead, lower 
cognitive ability was associated with prejudice towards groups perceived as liberal, 
unconventional, or as having little choice over their group membership; however, higher 
cognitive ability was associated with prejudice towards groups perceived as conservative, 
conventional, or as having greater choice over their group membership. The perceived status of 
the target groups did not play a role. Further, the size of intergroup biases among people low and 
high in cognitive ability was equal to each other (i.e. the difference between the groups they like 
vs. dislike was equal in size).  
This study suggests that low cognitive ability does not seem to orient people toward 
prejudice per se. Instead, these findings confirm previous work by showing a clear relationship 
between low cognitive ability and prejudice towards unconventional groups (e.g., Onraet et al., 
2015). But they also go further to suggest that the conclusion that low cognitive ability is 
associated with prejudice is too broad. High cognitive ability is also associated with prejudice, 
just towards different sets of groups.  
Summary 
Together, these findings indicate that, like religious and political worldviews, Openness 
to Experience, disgust sensitivity, and cognitive abilities are inconsistent predictors of prejudice. 
The strength and direction of their effect on prejudice depends on characteristics of the target 
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(e.g., ideology, conventionality, approach to traditional sexual morality). These characteristics 
are markers of dissimilarity and worldview conflict. This means that many of the traits that we 
would have thought would help diminish the experience of worldview conflict among people 
with progressive worldviews actually do no such thing. Instead, they seem to orient people 
towards different targets of prejudice. What seemed like a paradox, does not appear to be a 
paradox after all. 
It would be nice to end on a note of such clarity. But, that would not do full justice to 
the data. Crawford and Brandt (2019) identified low Agreeableness as a consistent predictor of 
prejudice. Across a variety of targets with different types of characteristics, low Agreeableness is 
associated with prejudice. Further, low Agreeableness was not linked to disliking of non-human 
objects (i.e., frogs, robots), suggesting that the low Agreeableness-prejudice link observed in 
these studies is not attributable to a general negativity among those low in Agreeableness (e.g., 
Graziano et al., 2007), but rather an orientation towards others people. And so, although the 
paradox is not as acute, there is still a paradox. One simple explanation may be that the link 
between low Agreeableness and traditional worldviews is not strong enough to override the 
robust link between dissimilarity and prejudice. Another possibility is that the link between low 
Agreeableness and traditional worldviews is not straightforward. Although, there is a clear link 
between low Agreeableness and social dominance orientation (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), high 
agreeableness is actually associated with a religious worldview (Saroglou, 2002b). Unraveling 
the complex associations between Agreeableness, traditional worldviews, and prejudice may 
help further resolve the paradox we have identified in our work. 
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Why the Disconnect? 
As should be clear by now, our findings appear quite different from the typical findings 
in the prejudice literature. Whereas the previous literature suggests that people who are 
conservative, religious fundamentalist, low in Openness, disgust sensitive, and low in cognitive 
ability have a monopoly on prejudice and intolerance, our work finds that people who are liberal, 
less religious, high in Openness, low in disgust sensitivity, and high in cognitive ability are also 
prejudiced, just toward different targets. How do we come to such different conclusions?  
One possibility is that prior research on these topics is simply incorrect. We do not think 
that is the case. Conservatism, religious fundamentalism, low Openness, etc., do predict 
prejudice—just only toward certain types of target groups. Our simple improvement of including 
heterogeneous arrays of targets allows the operationalization of prejudice to match the definition 
of prejudice as a negativity toward any outgroup. This does not negate the fact that these factors 
do reliably predict prejudice toward low status and historically disadvantaged groups. Therefore, 
we believe that rather than incorrect, prior studies of the individual differences associated with 
prejudice were simply incomplete. With a fuller array of targets from across life and society, we 
can gain a more complex (but at times, more simple) understanding of the antecedents of 
prejudice.  
Another distinct, but related reason is that the prior literature was biased toward 
understanding the nature of prejudice towards low status, disadvantaged groups. There has long 
been an explicit acknowledgement of the use of social psychological research to address 
society’s ills (Allport, 1954; Crandall, 2019; Flyvbjerg, Landman, & Schram, 2012; Lewin, 
1946; Reicher & Haslam, 2013). These are no doubt noble efforts (with which we personally 
agree) motivated by good intentions. At the same time, there has also existed a tension between 
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social psychological science as a means of describing vs. altering the social world (Eagly, 2016). 
Social psychologists are predominantly politically left of center (e.g., Eitan et al., 2018; Inbar & 
Lammers, 2012), and some have suggested that this ideological imbalance in the field can lead to 
biased approaches to psychological research (Duarte et al., 2015; Jussim et al., 2016). Research 
on politics and prejudice are undoubtedly at the nexus of such concerns.  
Another possibility is that there are individual differences that might make people more 
(or less) prone to prejudice, but these tendencies are often overridden by other factors. For 
example, despite suggestions that conservatives are uniquely likely to see their opponents as 
threatening (Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017), people from across the political spectrum see 
their ideological opponents as threatening, and this threat motivates prejudice (e.g., Brandt et al., 
2015; Brandt & Van Tongeren, 2017; Crawford, 2014). These feelings of threat may override 
any of the tolerance-enhancing qualities of the personality traits and individual differences 
associated with more liberal and progressive ideologies. That is, whereas it may be that people 
high in Openness are more prone to tolerance, the clash of values may eliminate that 
predispositional response.  
One way to test this possibility is to examine how worldviews, personality, and 
motivations are related to intergroup bias within the minimal groups paradigm (Diehl, 1990). In 
this paradigm, the outgroup is not necessarily threatening, at least in terms of not sharing values 
or threatening safety of the self or others. Initial studies have examined how worldviews (e.g., 
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation) and personality (e.g., Openness, Empathetic 
concern) are associated with ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm, but they do not 
provide clear evidence that traits associated with progressive worldviews have a predispositional 
response that reduces bias (Bergh et al., 2016; Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, Ryan, Bizumic, & 
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Subasic, 2007; Hodson & Sorrentino, 2001). For example, Reynolds and colleagues (2007) 
found that personality and worldviews were typically unrelated to intergroup bias, except in 
specific circumstances: authoritarianism was related to more intergroup bias when group choice 
was seen as voluntary and social dominance orientation was related to more intergroup bias 
when it reinforced group status. Other circumstances and other traits were not clearly related to 
intergroup bias. Similarly, Hodson and Sorrentino (2001) found that uncertainty orientation was 
related to more intergroup bias, but only under conditions of task uncertainty. And finally, the 
most consistent correlation found by Bergh and colleagues (2016) was a positive association 
between empathic concern and intergroup bias. That is, people higher on empathic concern, who 
also tend to be adhere to more progressive worldviews (Sidanius et al., 2012), expressed more 
intergroup bias in the minimal groups paradigm. To us, this inconsistent set of results suggests 
that liberals and progressive worldviews, as well as their associated traits, are not a wholesale 
salve on intergroup bias, even when groups are minimally defined.  
Open Questions 
The results provide clear support for the worldview conflict hypothesis across multiple 
domains. When it comes to the association between worldviews and prejudice, the worldview 
conflict hypothesis makes more accurate predictions than the traditional hypothesis. Although 
the support for the worldview conflict hypothesis is strong, there are still open questions. 
Open Question #1: What are the Key Mechanisms? 
One key open question is the mechanism (or mechanisms) that contribute to the 
worldview conflict effect. The worldview conflict hypothesis predicts that people will express 
prejudice toward individuals and groups who hold dissimilar and conflicting worldviews. This 
prediction is built on several different research traditions that each suggest other, more specific 
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mechanisms for why people would be bothered by people who hold differing worldviews. An 
open question is the degree these more specific mechanisms help account for the worldview 
conflict effect. 
Different Attitudes vs. Different Identities. Is worldview conflict driven by 
differences in attitudes and values or by differences in group identities? Our work on the 
worldview conflict hypothesis originally built on research that found that people express 
prejudice toward groups who are perceived to hold different and conflicting values (Brandt et al., 
2014) and tied these perspectives to similarity-liking perspectives that find that people like those 
who agree with them (Bryne, 1969). Consistent with this framing, we have found that measures 
of perceived value violations (e.g., Wetherell et al., 2013), symbolic threat (e.g., Crawford, 
2014), and perceived attitude and belief dissimilarity (e.g., Brandt et al., 2015; Crawford et al., 
2017) are all consistently associated with prejudice and (statistically) mediate the associations 
between worldviews and prejudice. Affective polarization research (Iyengar et al., 2012), 
however, is originally built on research on social identity which finds that people tend to support 
their in-groups and derogate out-groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Consistent with this framing, 
measures of partisan and ideological identity are associated with prejudice toward partisan and 
ideological outgroups (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Mason, 2018a). This is consistent with the 
greater centrality of political identifications relative to specific issue content (Boutyline & 
Vaisey, 2017; Brandt, Sibley, & Osborne, in press; Converse, 1964).  
Although these two research areas identified conceptually similar results and make very 
similar predictions, the precise mechanism is different. A key question is whether it is possible to 
separate out one’s group identity from the values and attitudes associated with that identity? 
Groups, especially political groups, are not value free. People see groups as embodying different 
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norms and values, and identifying with a group also entails identifying with those norms and 
values to some degree. Tajfel (1974), for example, defines the social identity of an individual as 
the knowledge that he or she, “belongs to certain social groups together with some emotional and 
value significance” (p. 72) of his or her membership.  Here we see that relevant values are part of 
social identity. It is, of course, possible to identify with a group but not agree with all of its 
values and positions. Regardless, the overlap in attitudes, values, and identities suggests that 
studies that only assess politically-relevant identities cannot show evidence for identity over and 
above value-conflict and attitudinal dissimilarity. Similarly, studies that only assess values and 
attitudes cannot show evidence of worldview and value conflict over and above identities. 
For example, studies on value-conflict and attitudinal dissimilarity are not able to fully 
rule out identity mechanisms. The original work by Byrne and his colleagues (e.g., Byrne, 1969) 
finds that liking increases linearly with the proportion of shared attitudes. These studies do not 
include any assessments or manipulations of political identity suggesting a “pure” attitude effect. 
However, it’s also possible (and even highly likely) that people infer other people’s political 
identities from their attitudes. A person learning that their interaction partner is against same-sex 
marriage, for lower taxes, and for more military spending, might be forgiven if they also assume 
their interaction partner is a Republican (e.g., Crawford, Jussim, Madon, Cain, & Stevens, 2011). 
Similarly, when we measure perceived dissimilarity in terms of attitudes and values (e.g., Brandt 
et al., 2015), it is quite possible people also infer perceived dissimilarity in terms of other 
identities.  
There are some studies that try to tease these different mechanisms apart. One piece of 
evidence that conflicting attitudes and values might play a role comes from a study by Rogowski 
and Sutherland (2016). They find that people dislike candidates who are described as having 
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different political ideologies, and that this effect is stronger for people who have more extreme 
political ideologies themselves. Moreover, this effect of ideological differences on candidates 
dislike is substantially reduced when the focus is taken off of ideological differences by 
including a wealth of biographical information in the candidate description. That is, ideological 
differences matter, but they matter less when people do not pay attention to them. Other work 
has found that when people’s attitudes on a number of issues align (e.g., they hold the 
conservative position on all of the issues), they are more likely to express prejudice towards 
political outgroups (Bougher, 2017; see also Webster & Abramowitz, 2017). This occurs even 
when political identities are included as covariates and it occurs in different political eras. 
Combined, these results suggest that attitudinal and value differences, outside of identities, play a 
role in worldview conflict. 
However, other evidence supports an identity mechanism. First, the effect of issues may 
be particularly limited. Cross-lagged path models revealed that issue alignment (like that studied 
by Bougher, 2017) is associated with more prejudice towards partisan outgroups over time, but 
that this is only the case for people with high degrees of political knowledge (Lelkes, 2018). This 
suggests that although issue differences might play a role, they may only play a role for a subset 
of the most politically engaged citizens. More directly, ideological identification (i.e., 
identification as a liberal or a conservative) is associated with prejudice towards ideological 
outgroups, even when controlling for issue positions, and even for people who hold issue 
positions that are inconsistent with their ideological identification (e.g., conservatives who lean 
liberal on issue positions; Mason, 2018a).  
This combination of results provide mixed conclusions overall. Moreover, the studies 
that control for people’s positions on policy issues show more of a unique association between 
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people’s political identities and prejudice towards the political outgroup. However, this work just 
shows that people’s political identities are associated with prejudice towards an identity-based 
outgroup. Targets in these studies are typically described in terms of their political identities 
(e.g., feeling thermometers for the Republican party or for Liberals). It is not clear if identity is 
still the most consistent predictor of prejudice toward a group with different attitudes or policy 
positions (e.g., if the target is anti-abortion, rather than Republican). That is, political identities 
may be highly correlated with prejudice toward political identity groups because these measures 
are directly related to one another. If prejudice were assessed as it is expressed toward out-
groups based on policy, then attitudes towards specific policies may play the largest role. 
Although political identity and conflicting attitudes and values are theoretically different 
mechanisms, these mechanisms may be highly overlapping and redundant in many cases. 
Scholars who find this distinction important need to demonstrate the independent roles of 
political identity and conflicting attitudes and values in contexts where each construct is given a 
fair test. Earlier research on social identity and belief congruence theories found that identities 
often won out (for a brief review, see Tajfel, 1982, p. 25); however, these tests were typically not 
in the domain of worldviews. Perhaps a more compelling demonstration of this distinction is if 
these different mechanisms provide actionable insight into reducing the expression of prejudice 
towards political and worldview conflicting outgroups.  
Uncertainty Reduction. A more distal mechanism may be the reduction of uncertainty 
and the resolution of mental-conflict. Following from dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), a 
large number of theoretical perspectives in social psychology suggest that people want to avoid 
uncertainty and inconsistencies (for an integrated review, see Jonas et al., 2014). Feelings of 
uncertainty are aversive and cause people to feel anxiety and arousal (Proulx, Inzlicht, & 
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Harmon-Jones, 2012). To mitigate these negative feelings, people use a variety of strategies to 
reduce that uncertainty, including avoiding the uncertainty, reframing the uncertainty, and 
bolstering certainty in other life domains (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). This latter strategy, in 
particular, is relevant to prejudice and worldview defense.  
People are motivated to maintain a sense of understanding about the world (i.e. a sense 
of meaning) and uncertainty violates that understanding (Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 
2012). Identifying with groups, endorsing important attitudes, and bolstering worldviews are 
methods to deal with uncertainty because they can provide clear and meaningful ways to view 
the world and see how the world works (Greenberg et al., 1990; Proulx & Heine, 2008; Proulx & 
Major, 2013; Webber et al., 2018). One’s own worldview may not be effective at explaining how 
the world should and does work when faced with people who hold conflicting worldviews (and 
their related attitudes and identities). Expressing prejudice can reinforce the worldview and help 
people maintain certainty. 
There are relatively few direct tests of this hypothesis. In one example (Sekerdej, 
Kossowska, & Czernatowicz‐Kukuczka, 2018), a small community sample of religious people 
from Poland were primed with uncertainty (vs. a control condition) and then the importance of 
religious perceptions, perceptions of groups violating values, and prejudice were assessed. In a 
mediation analysis, uncertainty was associated with more prejudice towards both atheists and 
homosexuals via increases in the importance of religious behaviors and perceived value 
violations. Another study did not manipulate uncertainty directly, but rather directly exposed a 
small sample of religious participants to worldview-threatening information (i.e., an atheistic 
worldview; Kossowska, Szwed, Czernatowicz-Kukuczka, Sekerdej, & Wyczesany, 2017). 
Following this exposure, participants experienced higher heart rate, an index of threat (e.g., 
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Harmon‐Jones, Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996; Robinson & Demaree, 2007), and this 
higher heart rate was highest among people with more orthodox beliefs. Importantly, the 
orthodox participants who were given the chance to express their prejudice towards atheists 
experienced decreased heart rate compared to participants in a control condition, suggesting that 
the expression of prejudice helps religious participants cope with threat. 
The two examples in the prior paragraph are consistent with the idea that feelings of 
threat and uncertainty underlie worldview conflict effects; however, they are also consistent with 
the traditional hypothesis because they find that people with a more traditional worldview 
express prejudice towards groups that violate their values. They do not look at participants who 
are not religious, for example, and how they express prejudice towards people that violate their 
values. One study has rectified this limitation (Kossowska, Czernatowicz‐Kukuczka, & Sekerdej, 
2017). In a small sample, participants first completed measures of intolerance of uncertainty, 
dogmatic beliefs, and attitudes towards religion. Participants were then invited to the lab where 
they were primed with uncertainty (vs a control condition) and completed measures of prejudice 
that violated the values of either religious or non-religious people. The authors first use statistical 
mediation models and find that general dogmatic beliefs were associated with both religious 
orthodoxy and dogmatic atheism, and that these beliefs mediated the association between general 
dogmatic beliefs and prejudice towards value violators (i.e., homosexuals, atheists, pro-life 
supporters, Catholics). Then, the authors show that this mediation model for both homosexual 
and for pro-life supporter targets only holds when participants are primed with uncertainty. This 
suggests that prejudice towards value violators helps people address people’s feelings of 
uncertainty for people with both traditional and non-traditional worldviews. 
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The work conducted by the Kossowska lab is a promising start for understanding how 
feelings of threat and uncertainty might underpin the expression of prejudice towards value 
violating groups. Notably, whether worldview conflict effects are driven more by differences in 
attitudes versus differences in identities is not relevant for whether or not uncertainty plays a role 
as both attitudes and identities have been identified as mechanisms for addressing feelings of 
threat and uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Proulx & Major, 2013; Sleegers, Proulx, & Van Beest, 2015; 
Webber et al., 2018). However, this work is just the start for identifying the role of threat and 
uncertainty. The data, so far, is focused on religious and atheistic worldviews in one country and 
with relatively small sample sizes. Additional studies with different worldviews, from different 
countries, and with larger samples will help us understand the extent these processes generalize 
beyond the contexts of these specific studies. 
Open Question #2: Will the Traditional Hypothesis Find Support with Different Measures? 
Despite the fact that our findings differ from those in the broader prejudice literature, 
our approach to construct measurement is very similar. Regarding individual differences, we 
have used the same measures of Big Five traits (Crawford & Brandt, 2019), cognitive ability 
(Brandt & Crawford, 2016), ideology (Crawford et al., 2017; Wetherell et al., 2013), and 
religiosity (Brandt & van Tongeren, 2017) used in the literature (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2014; 
Onraet et al., 2015; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Likewise, in measuring prejudice, we have 
primarily (though not exclusively) relied on feeling thermometer and social distance ratings, 
which are the most widely used measures of prejudice in the literature (Correll, Judd, Park, & 
Wittenbrink, 2010). Additionally, we have used other well-accepted prejudice measures such as 
the IAT (Crawford et al., 2017), positive and negative trait attributions (Crawford et al., 2013), 
willingness to discriminate (Wetherell et al., 2013), political intolerance (Crawford & Pilanski, 
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2014), and discrimination in dictator games (Crawford et al., 2017). The advantage of these 
measures is that they can be tailored to any type of target group, and can be easily administered.   
That said, these are usually single-item (or sometimes three-item, in the case of social 
distance) assessments of each group (unless feeling thermometer and social distance ratings are 
averaged together, which is sometimes the case; e.g., Crawford et al., 2017). One trend in the 
broader literature not yet adopted within the worldview conflict literature is the use of multi-item 
batteries assessing attitudes toward a particular group (e.g., anti-gay attitudes, LaMar & Kite, 
1998; anti-Black attitudes, McConahay, 1983). Such multi-item measures may be more reliable, 
and often attempt to capture multiple dimensions of attitudes (e.g., stereotypes, negative affect, 
emotional arousal) that are more difficult to accomplish for a heterogeneous array of target 
groups. To be fair, we have employed such approaches when randomly assigning participants to 
only one of several targets with varying political orientations (e.g., Crawford et al., 2017, Study 
5), and we often include measures of different types of threats that may uniquely predict 
prejudice towards certain groups (e.g., realistic threat, rights threat; Brandt & Van Tongeren, 
2017; Crawford, 2014). But, we may be missing some nuances of the predictors of prejudice 
toward heterogeneous arrays of groups by using more efficient prejudice measures.  
A related possibility is that different emotions underlie prejudice for different 
ideological groups and this could have consequences for how prejudice is translated into 
behavior. Emotions have different behavioral consequences (Mackie & Smith, 2018; Mackie, 
Maimer, & Smith, 2009; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, & Breugelmans, 2008). For example, if anger 
underlies prejudice for some groups, but fear underlies prejudice for other groups, the outcomes 
could differ. Anger typically inspires a more aggressive response, whereas fear may inspire more 
of an avoidance response. Similarly, hatred, disgust, and envy may lead to different actions, such 
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as elimination, purification, and the leveling of group differences, respectively. Importantly, 
different groups have different norms about the appropriate emotions to express and to feel (Gao, 
Chen, & Li, 2016; Leonard, Moons, Mackie, & Smith, 2011), something that likely extends to 
groups defined by worldviews (cf. Cohen, Pliskin, & Halperin, 2019; Hasson Tamir, Brahms, 
Cohrs, & Halperin, 2018). Furthermore, depending on the precise constellation of stereotypes 
and appraisals, people feel different emotions towards different groups (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 
2007). If people with different worldviews experience different emotions due to their own group 
norms and the particular groups they feel prejudice towards, the consequences of prejudice may 
be different depending on one’s worldview. At this stage, it is unclear if these different 
emotional processes contribute to different outcomes for people from different worldviews.  In 
the one study we have collected data on intergroup emotions (Crawford et al., 2017, Study 5), we 
find symmetrical expressions of ideological outgroup bias on a general negative emotions factor 
(e.g., anger, disgust, resentment), but no effects on a secondary factor of negative emotions (e.g., 
envy, fear).  
It may also be the case that whereas there are similarities between worldviews when it 
comes to expressing prejudice, the differences between worldviews emerge in other ways. For 
example, perhaps people high in Openness are more likely to reconsider their negative 
impressions of people from conventional groups? Or perhaps people low on fundamentalism are 
more likely to tolerate working with religious fundamentalists despite their negative impressions 
of these groups? Such patterns of results would lend some credence to the traditional hypothesis 
and could be used to build a more nuanced understanding of the link between worldviews, 
worldview conflict, and prejudice. However, until such effects are identified and replicated we 
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believe that the most parsimonious model is the model underlying the worldview conflict 
hypothesis. 
Open Question #3: How Can We Reduce Worldview Conflict? 
For nearly as long as social psychologists have studied the nature of prejudice, they 
have studied how to reduce it (Allport, 1954). Probably the best known and most well-regarded 
area of prejudice and conflict reduction research has been in the intergroup contact tradition. As 
Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) show, positive intergroup contact can reduce prejudice. Of course, 
certain parameters that support positive intergroup contact (e.g., equal status, cooperation, shared 
goals) are difficult to achieve in political conflict as polarized as current U.S. politics is (Lelkes, 
2016). Moreover, bias reduction strategies that have worked in other domains, like self-
affirmation, do not work to reduce partisan conflict in the U.S. (Levendusky, 2018b). Indeed, 
levels of political polarization in the U.S. suggest that research on resolving intractable conflicts 
(e.g., between Israelis and Palestinians) may be a useful model for approach political conflict.  
Work by Halperin and colleagues has focused on the role of emotion in intractable 
conflicts. Specifically, this work advances the idea that changing the way that people appraise 
outgroups or conflicts can alter the emotional responses to those targets, and ultimately, attitudes 
toward those targets (e.g., Gross, Halperin, & Porat, 2013). For instance, Halperin and Gross 
(2011) found that Israeli Jews’ tolerance of Palestinians increased (and their negative emotions 
decreased) following a reappraisal intervention that asked participants to take a detached, neutral, 
scientific perspective to the conflict. Goldenberg, Cohen-Chen, Goyer, Dweck, Gross, and 
Halperin (2018) provide longitudinal evidence that encouraging people to think of groups as 
malleable improves intergroup attitudes and increases hope for the resolution of conflict.  
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Goldenberg et al.’s (2018) intervention was found to be as effective (or in some 
instances, more effective) than another common approach toward conflict resolution—
perspective taking (Bilali & Vollhardt, 2013), in which participants are encouraged to take the 
vantage point of the target group or its individual members. For instance, Kalla and Broockman 
(2016) find that interacting with door-to-door canvassers who encourage perspective-taking and 
active processing of the issue can increase positive attitudes toward transgender people, with 
effects lasting as long as three months. Interestingly, they find no difference between transgender 
and non-transgender canvassers in encouraging positive intergroup attitudes. While this finding 
may be inconsistent with the contact hypothesis, it suggests that allied non-group members can 
successfully advocate on behalf of targeted groups (which is especially effective for targeted 
groups in a numerical minority; Paluck, 2016).  
For American political polarization and worldview conflict more generally, this 
research has a few implications. From a worldview conflict perspective, if dissimilarity is one of 
the primary driving forces for conflict, a reappraisal perspective would suggest encouraging 
participants to detach from the feelings that dissimilarity and disagreement inspire. From a 
perspective-taking perspective (ahem), partisans might be encouraged to try to understand 
someone else’s reasons or motives for their political beliefs, rather than their presumed reasons. 
At this writing, evidence for any of these processes in this context are sparse, and should be an 
area of future inquiry. Work that targets political disagreement has had mixed results. Eschert 
and Simon (2019) find that inducing a feeling of respect from one’s outgroup can improve 
attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs, and it might be possible to do this by including 
worldview-dissimilar others in political conversation (Voelkel, Ren, & Brandt, 2019). While 
some evidence suggests that pointing out people’s lack of understanding of policies leads them to 
Worldview Conflict & Prejudice  63 
 
take less extreme positions on those policies (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013), this 
work has failed to directly replicate (Crawford, 2019), and does not extend to improved 
intergroup attitudes (Crawford, 2019; Voelkel, Brandt, & Colombo, 2018).  
One approach that does have both promise and evidentiary value is based on the 
common ingroup identity model (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). This 
work finds that encouraging conflicting groups (e.g., Whites and Blacks) to consider common, 
shared, superordinate social identities (e.g., Americans) can improve intergroup attitudes. This 
approach has proved successful for reducing partisan biases (Levendusky, 2018a). In three 
experiments using large samples of Americans, Levendusky (2018a) found that priming people 
with an American identity increased positive feelings and positive trait attributions towards the 
out-party. This effect was consistent across both strong and weak partisans. Outside the 
experimental context, this same paper reported field studies that found that Americans expressed 
more positive attitudes about the out-party’s candidates closer to the July 4th holiday or to the 
2008 Summer Olympics, naturally occurring primes of American identity. Similarly, 
immediately following the execution of Osama bin Laden, partisans were more likely to trust one 
another (Carlin & Love, 2018). These results suggest that a common ingroup identity may help 
reduce worldview conflict, but additional tests are needed to see if this extends beyond partisan’s 
perceptions of the outparty.  
Of course, one must consider whether improved feelings toward outgroups, or 
normalization and tolerance, are the goals. For example, improving intergroup relations may 
reduce motivation to address societal issues, such as inequality (Dovidio, Gaertner, Ufkes, 
Saguy, & Pearson, 2016). Similarly, reducing worldview conflict may increase tolerance for 
otherwise abhorrent views. Moreover, changing attitudes might not be the most relevant target of 
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intervention. Paluck (2009) suggests that changing beliefs about social norms of tolerance and 
acceptable intergroup behavior may be more important to focus on than changes in feelings 
towards outgroups per se.  
Is All Worldview Conflict Morally Equivalent? 
Sometimes, descriptive research can appear as if it is proscriptive. Indeed, as some have 
argued (Duarte et al., 2015; Tetlock, 1994), this has likely been the case for the long history of 
the social psychology of prejudice—that social psychologists have sought to understand the roots 
of prejudice towards groups for whom they believed prejudice and discrimination were 
unwarranted.  
Our descriptive research is not proscriptive. We find that people with different 
worldviews are equally likely to express prejudice and discriminatory intentions towards 
dissimilar groups. However, we do not argue that all prejudices are equally bad or that they have 
the same moral weight. It is quite possible that prejudices directed toward unconventional 
groups, low status groups, and historically disadvantaged groups causes more harm to those 
groups or to society more broadly. The social capital and financial resources of high status and 
conventional groups may offset the effects of prejudice directed at these groups, just as perceived 
social support appears to buffer the negative effects of stigma (e.g., Beals, Peplau, & Gable, 
2009). In this way, our work suggests that although there is a psychological equivalence between 
different worldviews when it comes to prejudice, this psychological equivalence is not the same, 
nor does it imply, moral equivalence (see also Ditto et al., 2019b). 
Systematic explorations of the disparate consequences of prejudice directed at lower vs. 
higher status targets are lacking. However, there is some evidence that there are more victims of 
right-wing hate groups than left-wing hate groups (Badaan, 2019). More indirectly, despite some 
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people’s belief that high status groups (Whites) are now more often victims of discrimination 
than low status groups (Berman, 2019; Norton & Sommers, 2011), the extent of racial, income, 
and gender inequalities are stubbornly large (Bialik & Cilluffo, 2017; Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 
2017; Richeson & Sommers, 2016). This suggests that the prejudice directed at high status and 
more conventional groups does not have the same societal impact as prejudice directed at low 
status and more unconventional groups. Given that people see harm and immorality as linked 
(Schein & Gray, 2018), we would make the more normative claim that prejudice directed at low 
status and unconventional groups is more immoral than prejudice directed as high status and 
conventional groups. 
Thus, studying psychological equivalences of worldview conflict across groups does not 
mean that one will conclude that all prejudices are morally equivalent (e.g., if prejudice towards 
low status groups is more prevalent, or disproportionately harmful to physical or mental health, 
than prejudice towards high status groups). Moreover, learning the origins of prejudice towards 
high status and conventional groups may be applicable for promoting other causes that some 
people likely consider moral. For example, we know that prejudice towards low status and 
unconventional groups is related to policies that disproportionately harm those groups and their 
interests (e.g., Federico & Sidanius, 2002; Herek, 2011). Similarly, prejudice towards high status 
and conventional groups may motivate policy changes aimed at increasing equality and reducing 
the dominance of various conventional groups in cultural discourse. That is, understanding the 
equivalent psychological processes linking different worldviews to prejudice may provide 
avenues for understanding how to motivate social change on behalf of low status groups.  
How Does Worldview Conflict Fit into Broader Research on Ideological (As)Symmetries? 
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Our research on worldview conflict is one piece of a broader debate within social and 
political psychology regarding ideological symmetries and asymmetries. Broadly speaking, this 
is a question of the psychological similarities and differences between liberals and conservatives. 
Most scholars agree that liberals and conservatives differ in the content of their beliefs. They 
hold onto different values, they support different political issues, and they find different things 
worthy of their moral concern (e.g., Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). 
These differences cut to the core of what it means to be liberal or conservative and these 
differences are the differences necessary to find that liberals and conservatives find different sets 
of groups worldview violating. Differences in content, then, are not part of the larger debate 
about ideological symmetries and asymmetries. 
What is up for debate is the extent that liberals and conservatives differ in terms of other 
types of psychological processes and the extent these differences can be observed in other 
domains. For example, Jost (2017) argues that ideological asymmetry is the cornerstone of 
political psychology, and he reviews meta-analytic evidence for ideological asymmetries in 
existential and epistemic motivations (e.g., Jost et al., 2003, 2017).4 It does make sense that 
different beliefs will have different psychological functions, leading to some of the asymmetries 
identified by the field. And so, for our discussion here we take as a given that there are 
ideological differences in existential and epistemic motivations.  
From our perspective, the symmetry vs. asymmetry debate centers primarily around the 
outcomes that result from these psychological differences. In regards to prejudice, several 
psychological models posit that the individual differences and motivations associated with 
                                                 
4 Although there have been challenges to the robustness of these conclusions for both methodological (Malka et al., 
2017) and theoretical reasons (Eadeh & Chang, in press; Malka & Soto, 2015), for our discussion here we put these 
aside. 
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conservatism (e.g., low cognitive ability, low Openness, disgust sensitivity, dogmatism) incline 
people toward negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Hodson & Dhont, 2015). 
However, as we have reviewed, this is not the case. Rather than finding increased intergroup 
biases among conservatives and people with traditional worldviews, we instead find similar 
intergroup biases among both liberals and conservatives. This might lend credence to the idea 
that these individual difference differences are not reliable (Malka et al., 2017), or it may suggest 
the individual differences that divide liberals and conservatives do not necessarily bleed through 
to have impacts on the expression of prejudice. That is, individual differences may be the causes 
of worldviews, but that the consequences of worldviews, such as the motivation to defend the 
worldviews, are the consequences (cf. Brandt, Wetherell, & Reyna, 2014). Although there are 
asymmetries in the causes, the consequences may be more psychologically symmetrical. 
The finding that individual difference variables do not necessarily bleed through to have 
an impact on expressions of prejudice also emerges in other domains. For instance, some suggest 
that because needs for closure, certainty, and structure undergird political conservatism, 
conservatives should be more prone to biased reasoning and selective exposure (e.g., Nam, Jost, 
& Van Bavel, 2013). The evidence for this is quite mixed, however; while some studies provide 
evidence of asymmetry, others provide evidence of symmetry (e.g., studies included in Ditto et 
al., 2019). Capturing the complexities of the debate, there are large-scale social media studies 
showing that conservatives are more likely to selective expose on Twitter (Barbera et al., 2015) 
and that liberals are more likely to selectively expose on Facebook (Bakshy, Messing, & 
Adamic, 2015). A recent meta-analysis of the biased assimilation literature suggested no 
differences in biased assimilation between liberals and conservatives (Ditto et al., 2019). One 
clear possibility is that whereas there might be small but reliable differences between liberals and 
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conservatives in the types of needs and motives that would be associated with motivated 
reasoning, these effects are small relative to the larger ideological motives to maintain one’s 
prior beliefs (Ditto et al., 2019, p. 11).  
Future research needs to better answer the question as to why we observe ideological 
differences in certain individual differences and motivations, but we do not reliably find 
differences in the purported outcomes of those individual differences and motivations. And if 
these individual differences and motivations cannot be used to make reliable predictions about 
the expression of prejudice, selective exposure, and biased assimilation, then they appear to tell 
us little about differences in ideological and political behaviors and attitudes of much 
consequence.   
Conclusion 
We build on Allport’s (1954) legacy of studying the nature of prejudice, including how 
prejudice is related to worldviews and personality. But rather than studying the nature of 
prejudice, our work expands the possible targets of prejudice so that we can study the nature of 
prejudices. We discussed four core findings 
1. The link between worldview conflict and prejudice is consistent across worldviews. 
2. The link between worldview conflict and prejudice is found across various expressions of 
prejudice. 
3. The link between worldview conflict and prejudice is found in multiple countries. 
4. Traits and individual differences historically associated with less prejudice, may in fact 
also show evidence of worldview conflict. 
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Together, the findings suggest that the psychological processes underlying prejudice are 
consistent across worldviews and that these similar processes lead people with different 
worldviews to express prejudice towards different groups.   
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